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RECENT CASES
than the power to regulate under the commerce clause.58 However, the 1974
amendments were not held inapplicable to the states due to any lack of
affirmative power in Congress to reach the terms of employment of state
employees. The constitutional limitation in National League of Cities pro-
hibits certain federal regulation in spite of the broad reach of the commerce
power. It could be argued that the same limitation would operate to bar
spending conditioned in such a way as to displace the state functions
identified in National League of Cities as "essential to their separate and
independent existence."
The recognition by the Court that Congress' commerce power is subject
to a "state sovereignty" limitation is a significant step toward the preserva-
tion of the vitality of our federal system of government. Although the
boundary line around the "integral functions" of state and local government
is not absolutely defined, identification of the issue in this type of case as
being intergovernmental immunity rather than the reach of the commerce
power should provide a framework for the further protection of the dual
nature of American government. It may be no accident that National League
of Cities comes at a time when the prevailing political mood contains
"anti-Washington" feeling generally directed at the centralized decision-
making of the federal bureaucracy. This constitutional limitation safeguards
the continued ability of the states to engage in independent decision-making
in certain areas of activity. The importance of that ability to the prevention
of the abuse of power by the federal government has been recognized, not




APPROVES CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION
FOR TRANSMISSION OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY IN A TRIAL FOR A MUNICIPAL
ORDINANCE VIOLATION
Kansas City v. McCoy1
Defendant McCoy was charged with violation of a Kansas City, Mis-
souri, municipal ordinance prohibiting the possession of marijuana. Upon
conviction in a municipal court, he appealed to a circuit court and obtained a
trial de novo. A crime laboratory expert testified that the substance that
58. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
59. The Federalist No. 51, at 227 (C. Beard ed. 1948) (J. Madison).
1. 525 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
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defendant possessed was marijuana. This testimony at both trials was given
by closed circuit television, the witness being in the crime laboratory. The
expert in the laboratory could see and hear both the judge and questioning
counsel; the judge (there was no jury) and counsel in the courtroom could
see and hear the expert.2 Although defendant waived cross-examination of
the expert,3 he objected to the testimony on grounds that it violated the
Confrontation Clause of the sixth amendment. Testimony was received
over his objection4 and he was convicted in circuit court. 5 The Missouri
Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, holding that the testimony did not
violate the Confrontation Clause.
6
McCoy is the first appellate approval in the nation of a prosecutor's use
of closed circuit television (CCTV) at trial. CCTV offers several advantages
to a prosecutor.7 Taxpayers' money is saved because witnesses employed by
the state do not have to sit in the courtroom through days of trial to give
testimony. They can be called to testify at the proper time where they work.
Because CCTV can bring the trial to the witnesses, prosecutions do not have
to be defaulted because a witness is out of the jurisdiction of the court.
There are disadvantages in using CCTV. Some of these directly affect
what the fact finder sees. Inherent in the television process is lack of fine
detail' and distortion of the subject being televised.9 The narrow scope of
the camera limits what the viewer can see'0 and makes the cameraman an
editorialist." Attention span is decreased when watching television. 12 Addi-
2. Id. at 337.
3. Id. at 338.
4. Id. at 337-38.
5. Id. at 337. McCoy was given a thirty-day municipal farm sentence.
6. Id. at 339.
7. See generally Kornblum, Videotape in Civil Trials, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 12-14
(1972); McCrystal, Videotape Trials: Relief For Our Congested Courts, 49 DENVER L.J.
463, 478-79 (1973); Comment, VideoTape Trials: A Practical Evaluation and a Legal
Analysis, 26 STAN. L. REV. 619,630-31 (1974). Although many of the authorities cited
in this note deal with videotape trials and not with CCTV, they have application to the
present case because they, too, utilize television for trial testimony, not merely for
depositions. Videotape trials are trials in which all of the testimony is videotape.
Testimony which is objected to and the judge sustains is deleted. After putting the
testimony in a logical order, the resulting edited tape is played back to the jury. For
more complete information see Doret, Trial by Videotape-Can Justice Be Seen To Be
Done? 47 TEMP. L.Q. 228,232 (1974); McCrystal, supra at 466-76; Comment, supra at
619-21.
8. Bermant & Jacoubovitch, Fish Out of Water: A Brief Overview of Social and
Psychological Concerns About Videotaped Trials, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 999, 1001 (1975);
Doret, supra note 7, at 241-42.
9. Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 508 (8th Cir. 1972) (dissenting
opinion); Doret, supra note 7, at 243.
10. Doret, supra note 7, at 233-34, 241.
11. Id. at 233-35, 245.
12. Id. at 248; Comment, Videotape Trials: Legal and Practical Implications, 9
COLUM. J. LAW & SOCIAL PROBS. 336, 388 (1973); Comment, supra note 7, at 635.
[Vol. 42
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tionally, witnesses atypically relax when faced only with a camera. 3
Other disadvantages indirectly affect the fact finding process. The
witness is not in a "charged" atmosphere which is said to elicit truth.
1 4
Cultural conditioning of the fact finder to the television medium psychologi-
cally influences the impact of televised testimony. 5 With CCTV the witness
can not see the jury's reaction to his testimony.' 6 This might be important,
for instance, if the witness is unduly confident, enhancing his story with
unnecessary personal observations to make it more interesting for the jury.
He might be more direct and careful with his testimony if he could see that a
jury had lost interest in his embellishments.
Television can hurt the court system in ways other than hindering fact
determination.' 7 For instance, the courts serve useful symbolic and ritualis-
tic functions such as embodiment of justice that transcend one case or
decision. It is possible that this function will suffer if a method of communi-
cation is used that is associated with entertainment.18
CCTV raises several constitutional problems. 9 Because the witness is
not physically present in the courtroom, it is questionable whether the
defendant is "confronted with the witnesses against him" as the sixth
amendment requires. However, guidelines that have emerged from recent
Supreme Court cases suggest that the Confrontation Clause does not
require that the witness contemporaneously testify in the presence of the
fact finder and the defendant in every instance.20
Generally, all out of court statements that have been subject to cross-
examination are admissible despite a claim of denial of confrontation if the
witness is unavailable for trial2' or is available at trial for contemporaneous
cross-examination. 22 In addition there is indication that out of court state-
ments that have not been subjected to cross-examination may be admissible
provided they exhibit reliability. 23 Therefore, observation of demeanor as
13. Bermant, Chappell, Crockett, Jacoubovitch & McGuire, Juror Responses to
Prerecorded Videotape Trial Presentations in California and Ohio, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 975,
987, 993 (1975); Comment, supra note 7, at 630.
14. Doret, supra note 7, at 244; Comment, supra note 12, at 388.
15. Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 508 (8th Cir. 1972) (dissenting
opinion); Barber & Bates, Videotape in Criminal Proceedings, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1017,
1041 (1974); Bermant, supra note 8, 1003-04; Doret, supra note 7, at 249.
16. Doret, supra note 7, at 250.
17. See Barber & Bates, supra note 15, at 1041-42; Bermant, supra note 8, at
1003-05; Doret, supra note 7, at 256-58.
18. Bermant, supra note 8, at 1003-05.
19. See generally Barber & Bates, supra note 15; Doret, supra note 7, at 258-66;
Comment, supra note 12, at 376-88; Comment, supra note 7, at 639-44.
20. The Supreme Court has always held that the Confrontation Clause did not
mandate the absence of hearsay. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
21. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 23.7 (1895).
22. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
23. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). The plurality indicated that because of
the circumstances, the testimony exhibited "indicia of reliability which have been
19771
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the witness contemporaneously testifies, historically one of the reasons for
the Confrontation Clause,2 4 has diminished importance.
25
CCTV allows contemporaneous cross-examination of the witness.
Thus, it should be at least as acceptable as hearsay that does not violate the
Confrontation Clause. Because CCTV does not allow unaltered transmis-
sion of the witnesses' demeanor,2 6 it differs from live testimony. Inability to
see the demeanor of the witness is not prohibited by the Court's current
interpretation of the Clause. 7 Therefore, CCTV should be allowable under
the Confrontation Clause as a substitute for live testimony. 28 However, the
Supreme Court has never been faced with a choice between contemporane-
ous testimony with observation of demeanor by a jury and contemporane-
ous testimony with observation of a distorted demeanor. In a case where the
verdict hinged on the credibility of one witness whose testimony was pre-
sented by CCTV, the Court might find demeanor, which is used to assess
credibility, much more important.
Because the witness is testifying only to a cameraman and not to the
court and spectators, the sixth amendment right to public trial is possibly
violated.29 The Court has exclusively interpreted the clause as a prohibition
of secret trials, trials that are totally isolated from the public eye.30 CCTV
widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement ... may be placed before a
jury. . though there is no confrontation of the declarant." Id. at 89. ButseeBruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In terms of the Confrontation Clause, Dutton
seems nearly indistinguishable from Bruton. However, the Dutton plurality distin-
guished Bruton on the basis of the importance of the testimony-testimony against
the defendant was "crucial" and in Dutton it was not-and the fact that testimony in
Dutton was admitted under a recognized exception to the hearsay rule and in Bruton it
was not. 400 U.S. at 86-7. The "crucial" testimony distinction implies that if question-
able testimony was "crucial," the Court could more readily find that Confrontation
Clause rights were violated regardless of reliability.
24. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); accord, Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (1965); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 721 (1968).
25. The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 30, 112 n.17, 115 (1970);
Comment, supra note 7, at 640. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970).
26. See Comment, supra note 12, at 381 & n.109; Comment, supranote 7, at 623
n.29. But see Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1972); People v.
Moran, 39 Cal. App. 3d 398,407-08, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413,418-20 (1974); Hutchins v.
State, 286 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Hewitt, 86 Wash. 2d 487,490, 545
P.2d 1201, 1204 (1976); Barber&Bates, supranote 15, at 1035; Comment, supranote
7, at 623.
27. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
28. See Barber & Bates, supra note 15, at 1035-36; Doret, supra note 7, at 260;
Comment, supra note 12, at 382; Comment, supra note 7, at 640-41.
29. See generally Barber & Bates, supra note 15, at 1036; Doret, supra note 7, at
259-61; Comment, supra note 12, at 383-85; Comment, supra note 7, at 642.
30. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). In Oliver, a one-man grand jury (a judge)
operating in secrecy summarily convicted defendant for contempt and sentenced
him to jail. The Supreme Court held that defendant's right to public trial was
violated. The Court claimed that the sixth amendment was included in the Constitu-
[Vol. 42
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trials are not secret trials in this sense. However, the purpose of the
prohibition is to stop governmental corruptness that can go unchecked in a
secreted situation."1 Because the public inaccessibility to the physical pres-
ence of the witness might invite conduct which the clause protects against,
such as prompting out of the camera's eye,3 2 the CCTV process could fall
within the purview of the right to public trial.
The requirements of procedural due process may also limit CCTV
testimony in a criminal prosecution. The question is whether defendant
receives a fair trial when CCTV is used.33 Arguably defendant does not,
because it distorts the accuracy of the visual component of input to the fact
finder.3 4 The Court has found due process violated only when the defen-
dant has demonstrated that some procedure causes bias or at least inherently
probable bias.3 5 Given the subtle ways in which CCTV interferes with the
information flow, it is questionable whether such bias can be shown. 6 Again,
if the credibility of the testimony of a key witness against the defendant was
important, the Court might find the disadvantages of CCTV as indicative of
the necessary bias.3 7
In McCoy the Missouri Supreme Court limited its holding to finding that
CCTV testimony by an expert witness in a prosecution for a municipal
ordinance violation did not infringe on Confrontation Clause rights.3 8 But
the majority impliedly left room for expansion of the use of CCTV by not
tion because of the distrust of secret trials made notorious by the Spanish Inquisition,
the English Court of Star Chamber, and the French lettre de cachet. Id. at 268-69. See
Barber & Bates, supra note 15, at 1036.
31. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,270-71 (1948). See Comment, supra note 7, at 642.
32. This is suggested by the.McCoy dissent's statement:
We do know that there were four people in the room with the witness who
were not shown on television, and there was no representative of the
defendant there at all.
525 S.W.2d at 340. See text accompanying note 41 infra.
33. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Comment, supranote 7,
at 639.
34. See notes 8-13, 26 and accompanying text supra. Alternatively, it might be
found unfair that the loss of the courtroom "charged atmosphere" lessens the
incentive for truth telling. See Doret, supra note 7, at 244.
35. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542 (1965); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466
(1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133
(1955).
36. See Comment, supra note 7, at 639. But see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,544
(1965), where the Court stated while speaking of publically televised trials:
Television in its present state and by its very nature, reaches into a variety
of areas in which it may cause prejudice to an accused. Still one cannot put
his finger on its specific mischief and prove with particularity wherein he
was prejudiced. This was found true in Murchison, Tumey, Rideau, and
Turner. Such untoward circumstances as were found in those cases are
inherently bad and prejudice to the accused was presumed.
37. But see People v. Moran, 39 Cal. App. 3d 398, 410-11, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413,
420 (1974).
38. 525 S.W.2d at 339.
19771
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acknowledging any of its disadvantages. Instead, the majority praised
CCTV as a new innovation that could "project the image and voice of man
clearly and distinctly" 39 and would' allow "examination and cross-
examination of the witness as much so as if he were there in person."40 In
contrast, the dissent noted several disadvantages of CCTV, including having
people in the room with the witness not shown on television, allowing no
handling of exhibits between either counsel and the witness, and presenting
altered demeanor of the witness. 4' The dissenters stated that the facts of the
case did not clearly raise the problems of CCTV with respect to Confronta-
tion Clause rights, 42 and that because the analysis of marijuana was not
contested, error, if any, was harmless.43 Nonetheless, the dissent pointed
out, the majority opinion served as an approval of CCTV in a "test case" for
the validity of its use.44
The Missouri Supreme Court's decision is constitutionally sound under
the facts of this case. As the majority noted, an expert's analysis which is
admitted under an official certificate exception to the hearsay rule has been
found not to violate the Confrontation Clause. 45 As previously discussed,
CCTV should be as acceptable as hearsay that is properly admissible under
the Clause. Additionally, the expert in McCoy testified to facts that were
uncontroverted. 46 The United States Supreme Court has indicated that
unless testimony is "crucial," denial of Confrontation Clause rights could be
harmless error.47 Although the Court has spoken only of cumulative tes-
timony as being not crucial, 48 uncontested testimony is similarly not crucial.
Because McCoy involved uncontested expert witness testimony, the use
of CCTV passes constitutional muster. Extension of the use of CCTV
beyond the circumstances approved in McCoy, however, should not be
regarded lightly. The use of CCTV for testimony of a key prosecution
witness would expose the disadvantages of CCTV and invite constitutional
prohibition.
A. WAYNE CAGLE, JR.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 340-41.
42. Id. at 340.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 341.
45. Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825
(1958); Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452, 253 N.E.2d 346 (1969).
46. See notes 3 and 43 and accompanying text supra.
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